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State v. Whittle Communications: Allowing Local School Boards
To Turn On "Channel One"
American children spend an average of twenty-eight hours per week
in front of a television set, and about one-fifth of this viewing time con-
sists of watching commercials.1 As a result, activist groups closely moni-
tor television advertisements targeted at children.2 In 1989, these
organizations became outraged when Whittle Communications (Whittle)
first introduced Channel One, a commercially-sponsored video news pro-
gram, into the public schools.' In fact, "much of the nation seemed
caught in passionate debate over the ethics of Channel One, Whittle's
newscast . .. that contains plugs for hamburgers and corn chips."4
While Channel One is designed to enhance students' awareness of cur-
rent events, it also is designed to sell products to its student viewers.
North Carolina entered the "passionate debate" in February of 1990
when the North Carolina State Board of Education (State Board) passed
a temporary rule which prevented local school boards from subscribing
to Channel One.' Ultimately, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ad-
dressed several pivotal questions concerning Channel One in State v.
Whittle Communications.' Did the State Board have authority under the
North Carolina Constitution or under the North Carolina General Stat-
utes to promulgate such a rule?8 Did the contracts between the local
school boards and Whittle violate the "taxation for public purposes
only" provision of the state constitution?9 Did the agreements contra-
vene the "free public schools" requirement of the state constitution? 0
The court answered each question in the negative. Specifically, the
1. Peter Hallifax, Children Watching Television Advertising: What's Wrong With This
Picture?, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 495, 495 (1990).
2. See Walter Goodman, Pilot News Program for Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989, at
C13 (organizations objecting to Channel One include the American Association of School Ad-
ministrators, the National Parent Teachers Association, and Action for Children's Television
(ACT)).
3. See id. at C13, C22 (describing the effect of the pilot program conducted in six cities in
the spring of 1989); N.R. Kleinfield, What Is Chris Whittle Teaching Our Children?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 49 (Chris Whittle formed Whittle Communica-
tions in 1986).
4. Kleinfield, supra note 3, at 32.
5. Goodman, supra note 2, at C13.
6. State v. Whittle Communications, 328 N.C. 456, 459-60, 402 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1991).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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court found that local boards of education, as opposed to the State
Board, have complete control over the selection and procurement of in-
structional materials such as Channel One. 1 Therefore, the State Board
transgressed its constitutional and statutory authority by adopting the
temporary rule. 12 The court also determined that the state constitution
does not bar local administrative units from contracting to receive Chan-
nel One. 3 The public purposes doctrine of taxation contained in article
V, section 2(1) of the constitution does not apply because the Channel
One contracts do not involve the expenditure of tax revenues. 14 Nor
does the free public schools provision of article IX, section 2(l) apply, as
students are not required to pay a fee to view Channel One.1"
This Note analyzes the statutory and constitutional implications of
the supreme court's decision in Whittle. The Note presents an overview
of the body of law relevant to both aspects of the case 16 and evaluates the
Whittle court's ruling against this backdrop."' The Note concludes that
while the court's logic was dubious in parts, the overall thrust of the
opinion is clearly reasoned and amply supported. The end result-a vic-
tory for local autonomy in public education-is perhaps the most lauda-
ble element of the decision.
Each edition of the Channel One newscast runs for twelve minutes,
including two minutes of commercial advertising.'" School boards wish-
ing to receive Channel One enter into contracts with Whittle whereby the
school boards pay no fee for the service but are bound by certain restric-
tions.'9 Each school must air the program at the same time daily.2" The
program must be shown ninety-five percent of the days school is in ses-
sion during the calendar quarter over which the contract extends. 2' Fi-
nally, school officials must submit records detailing the days when
students watch Channel One and the number of students who watch
11. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 466, 402 S.E.2d at 562.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 469-70, 402 S.E.2d at 563-64.
14. Id. at 469, 402 S.E.2d at 563-64; see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
15. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 470, 402 S.E.2d at 564; see infra notes 40-42 and accompanying
text.
16. See infra notes 47-76 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 77-125 and accompanying text.
18. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 459, 402 S.E.2d at 557.
19. Id.
20. Id. Channel One is broadcast via satellite at 6:00 a.m. every weekday, allowing school
officials to screen the content and ensure that it is appropriate for student viewing. Id. The
schools record the program on a videocassette recorder (VCR); later, it is played back to stu.
dents at the agreed time. Id.
21. Id.
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each program.22 The contracts specify that students who prefer not to
view the program are free to engage in some other activity. 23
Disturbed by these contracts, the State Board passed a temporary
rule on February 1, 1990 which essentially rendered Channel One un-
available to public schools by prohibiting agreements which restrict the
ability of administrators and teachers to decide either the content of
materials presented to students or the time at which such materials will
be presented.24 The rule further provided that schools may not enter into
contracts through which students regularly will be exposed to commer-
cial advertising.2"
The Thomasville City Board of Education (Thomasvile) violated
the temporary rule by signing a contract with Whittle after the rule's
adoption.26 In response, the State Board fied suit against Whittle and
Thomasville, 27 requesting the Wake County Superior Court to declare
the Channel One agreements unenforceable.28 The complaint asserted
that the contracts contravened the State Board rules, provisions of the
North Carolina Constitution, and public policy.29 The defendants asked
the court to declare the contracts valid and the temporary rule-making of
the State Board unlawful.3" Affirming the trial judge,31 the supreme
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 459-60, 402 S.E.2d at 558; N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, r. 6D.0105 (Feb. 1992).
25. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 460, 402 S.E.2d at 558.
26. Id.
27. The State of North Carolina and the Superintendent of Public Instruction joined the
State Board as plaintiffs. Id. at 461, 402 S.E.2d at 558. Additionally, the trial court allowed
the Davidson County Board of Education (Davidson) to intervene as a defendant. Id. David-
son contracted with Whittle to receive Channel One on January 29, 1990. Id. at 459, 402
S.E.2d at 558. Although the rule was not adopted until February 1, 1990, the State Board,
pursuant to an amendment approved on February 19, 1990, made the rule retroactive. Id. at
460, 402 S.E.2d at 558.
28. Id. at 461, 402 S.E.2d at 558. Prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings, the Ad-
ministrative Rules Review Commission sent a letter to the State Board indicating that the
State Board lacked statutory authority to promulgate the temporary rule in question. Id. at
460, 402 S.E.2d at 558. As a result, the State Board sought a judicial determination of the
legality of the rule.
29. Id. at 461, 402 S.E.2d at 558.
30. Id. at 461, 402 S.E.2d at 559.
31. Judge Stephens granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the Office of Administrative Hearings was the
proper forum for the dispute. Id. at 462, 402 S.E.2d at 559. The supreme court disagreed,
concluding that the State Board was not required to exhaust all administrative remedies before
filing the suit. Id. at 463, 402 S.E.2d at 560. The trial judge's ruling on the issue was harmless
error, however, because the trial court fully adjudicated the issues raised by the complaint
prior to dismissal. Id. Thus, the supreme court "affirmed" the portion of the order wherein
Judge Stephens made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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court held that the State Board lacked the authority to promulgate the
temporary rule, that the contracts neither violated the state constitution
nor contravened public policy.32
Specifically, the court found that the State Board had no authority
to make the temporary rule because the acts that the rule prohibited are
reserved by statute for local school boards.33 Article IX, section 5 of the
North Carolina Constitution grants the State Board power to create rules
and regulations to facilitate its supervision of the public school system,
provided the General Assembly has not otherwise restricted its author-
ity.34 According to the court, section 115C-98(b) of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which requires local school boards to develop written
policies concerning the procurement of instructional materials, is an ex-
ample of such a limitation.35 Because Channel One qualifies as instruc-
tional material, decisions regarding its use are solely within the province
of the local school boards. 36
In declaring the Channel One contracts constitutional, the court re-
jected the State Board's contention that the agreements violated article
V, section 2(1) of the state constitution, which mandates that the power
of taxation be exercised for public purposes.37 Under the terms of the
contracts, Whittle furnishes all equipment necessary to show the pro-
gram; therefore, the court found that the schools spend no tax money to
support the contracts38 and did not reach the question of whether Chan-
32. Id. at 471, 402 S.E.2d at 565. This Note does not examine separately the public policy
aspect of Whittle, as the court's public policy analysis overlapped with its discussion of the
statutory and constitutional issues presented in the case. For a brief review of the court's
findings with respect to public policy, see infra note 88.
33. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 468, 402 S.E.2d at 563.
34. Id. at 464, 402 S.E.2d at 560. The constitutional provision reads in pertinent part:
'The State Board of Education shall supervise and administer the free public school system...
and shall make all needed rules and regulations in relation thereto, subject to laws enacted by
the General Assembly." N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 5.
35. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 460, 402 S.E.2d at 562. Prior to amendment in 1990 the statute
provided in part: "Local boards of education shall adopt written policies concerning the pro-
cedures to be followed in their local school administrative units for the selection and procure-
ment of supplementary textbooks, library books, periodicals, and other instructional materials
needed for instructional purposes in the public schools of their units." Act of May 19, 1969,
ch. 519, § 115C-206.14(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 440, 444 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-98(b) (1991)).
36. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 466, 402 S.E.2d at 562.
37. Id. at 469, 402 S.E.2d at 563. Article V, section 2(1) states that "It]he power of taxa-
tion shall be exercised in ajust and equitable manner, for public purposes only." N.C. CONST.
art. V, § 2(l).
38. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 469, 402 S.E.2d at 563. The State Board claimed that the provi-
sion applied because tax funds finance the public school system generally-for example, tax
dollars are used to pay for busses and teachers' salaries. Id. Note that the State Board did not
base its argument on the nominal use of tax dollars for electricity to run the program. See id.
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nel One constitutes a public purpose.39
The court also rejected the State Board's claim that the contracts
contravened the "general and uniform system of free public schools"
clause of article IX, section 2(1).4 Despite the State Board's argument
that students "pay" in the form of their time to watch Channel One and
the advertising it airs, the court maintained that no authorities have
equated time with money in this context.4" This conclusion hinged
partly on the fact that viewing Channel One is not mandatory under the
agreement. 42
In dissent, Justice Martin, joined by Chief Justice Exum, first as-
serted that although section 115C-98(b) of the North Carolina General
Statutes directs local school boards to adopt written policies regarding
instructional materials, the applicable version of the statute did not grant
them the exclusive authority to acquire such materials.43 In fact, the
statute as amended in 1990 does explicitly grant exclusive authority, but
this amendment was not in effect at the time the contracts at issue were
executed.' Justice Martin next reasoned that, even if local school boards
solely controlled the procurement of such materials, the State Board's
But see infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing Kiddie Korner Day Sch. v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 55 N.C. App. 134, 144-45, 285 S.E.2d 110, 117 (1981) (where
the plaintiffs advanced and the court accepted a similar argument), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C.
300, 291 S.E.2d 150 (1982).
39. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 469, 402 S.E.2d at 563.
40. Id. at 470, 402 S.E.2d at 564. The constitutional provision reads in pertinent part:
"The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform
system of free public schools." N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1).
41. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 470, 402 S.E.2d at 564. Specifically, the court found unconvinc-
ing the State Board's analogy between students watching Channel One and paying incidental
fees for items such as gym uniforms or scholastic magazines. Id.; see infra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text.
42. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 470, 402 S.E.2d at 564.
43. Id. at 472, 402 S.E.2d at 565 (Martin, J., dissenting). Thus, according to the dissent,
the majority's interpretation was contrary to the "plain meaning of the words used by the
General Assembly." Id. at 472-73, 402 S.E.2d at 565 (Martin, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 472, 402 S.E.2d at 565 (Martin, J., dissenting). In contrast, the majority deter-
mined that the 1990 amendment merely clarified existing law. Id. at 468, 402 S.E.2d at 563.
The statute, as amended in 1990, reads in pertinent part:
Local boards of education shall adopt written policies concerning the procedures to
be followed in their local school administrative units for the selection and procure-
ment of supplementary textbooks ... audio-visual materials, and other supplemen-
tary instructional materials ....
Local boards of education shall have sole authority to select and procure supple-
mentary instructional materials, whether or not the materials contain commercial
advertising .... and to determine when the materials may be presented to students
during the school day. Supplementary materials and contracts for supplementary
materials are not subject to approval by the State Board of Education.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-98(b) (1991).
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rule simply prohibited them from delegating to some external entity the
responsibility of deciding when the materials will be used.4 5 Finally, cit-
ing evidence that teachers generally neither discuss Channel One's con-
tent with their classes nor test students on the material, Justice Martin
argued that the program is not instructional in nature, and, therefore,
section 115C-98(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes does not
apply.46
The Whittle decision rests on three areas of North Carolina law:
(1) section 115C-98(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes coupled
with the division of power between state and local authorities in public
education; (2) the public purposes doctrine of taxation found in article
V, section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution; and (3) the free pub-
lic schools requirement of article IX, section 2(1) of the state
constitution.
The General Assembly in 1969 enacted the original statutory provi-
sion addressing the procurement of instructional materials.47 The lan-
guage of the 1969 statute is nearly identical to that of its 1987
counterpart, except for minor stylistic differences.48 In the preamble to
the 1969 session law preceding the codification of section 115C-206.14,
the General Assembly enunciated the primary purpose of the statute: to
permit each school administrative unit to select its own supplementary
instructional materials.49
Although Whittle is the first case to demand judicial construction of
these statutes, the underlying concern of the statute-the division of
power within the public school system-has been addressed previously.
As early as 1871, the Supreme Court of North Carolina defined the struc-
ture of the public schools: "[T]he Constitution establishes the public
school system, and the General Assembly provides for it, by its own tax-
ing power, . . . and the State Board of Education, by the aid of school
committees, manage[s] it." 0 In other words, the State Board supervises
and administers the public school system pursuant to Article IX, Section
5 of the North Carolina Constitution, subject to the laws of the General
Assembly."
45. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 473-74, 402 S.E.2d at 566 (Martin, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 475-77, 402 S.E.2d at 567 (Martin, J., dissenting).
47. Act of May 19, 1969, ch. 519, § 115C-206.14(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 440, 444 (cur-
rent version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-98(b) (1991)).
48. See Act to Recodify Chapter 115, ch. 423, § 115C-98(b), 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 510,
544.
49. Act of May 19, 1969, ch. 519, § 115C-206.14(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 440, 440-41
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-98(b) (1991)).
50. Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153, 156 (1871).
51. Article IX, section 5 is quoted supra note 34; see also Guthrie v. Taylor, 279 N.C. 703,
[Vol. 701934
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One way in which the General Assembly may place statutory limita-
tions on the State Board is by delegating certain rule-making powers to
local boards. 2 Accordingly, in Hughey v. Cloninger,53 where citizens
sought to enjoin Gaston County from funding and operating a school for
dyslexic children, the supreme court stated that "[i]n its discretion the
General Assembly may delegate to local administrative units the general
supervision and control of schools within their boundaries."" a Where the
General Assembly is silent, however, the rule-making powers of the State
Board are limited only by the state constitution."
In Kiddie Korner Day Schools v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized that local
school boards have the responsibility to implement state policies con-
cerning public education set by the State Board and the State Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction. 7 Therefore, local school boards are "deemed
agents of the State for the purpose of providing public education,"58
although they have some leeway with respect to policies suited for indi-
vidual schools within their localities.5 9
713, 185 S.E.2d 193, 200 (1971) (confirming that the State Board derives authority from both
the state constitution in article IX, section 5, and the legislature in chapter 115 (currently
chapter 115C) of the General Statutes), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).
52. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47 (1991) (enumerating the powers and duties
of local school boards).
53. 297 N.C. 86, 253 S.E.2d 898 (1979).
54. Id. at 93, 253 S.E.2d at 903. The Hughey court ultimately held that funding the
school was not permissible under the statutory scheme for public education. Id. at 94-95, 253
S.E.2d at 903; see also Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 767, 28 S.E.2d 527, 530
(1944) (holding that the legislature may grant county boards of education the power to make
"necessary or expedient" rules).
55. See Guthrie, 279 N.C. at 710, 185 S.E.2d at 198-99. Rules of the State Board must
comport with the United States Constitution as well. For instance, a regulation cannot be
unreasonably discriminatory so as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 713, 185 S.E.2d at 200. The division of power within the school system
itself, however, generally is not subject to federal constitutional scrutiny: "How the power
shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a
question for the state itself." Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
56. 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), disc rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d
150 (1982).
57. Id. at 140-42, 285 S.E.2d at 114-15.
58. Id. at 140, 285 S.E.2d at 114 (citing Benvenue Parent-Teacher Ass'n v. Nash County
Bd. of Educ., 4 N.C. App. 617, 621, 167 S.E.2d 538, 541, appeal dismissed, 275 N.C. 675, 170
S.E.2d 473 (1969)).
59. Id. at 140, 285 S.E.2d at 115 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-27 (repealed 1981)). The
current version of the statute cited by the court reads in pertinent part: "Local boards of
education, subject to any paramount powers vested by law in the State Board of Education...
shall have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in
their respective local school administrative units." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-40 (1991). Thus,
in discussing this latitude of local school boards in areas of local interest, the Kiddie Korner
court presumably was referring to powers statutorily delegated by the General Assembly. See,
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Beyond contending that it had the authority to create the temporary
rule in Whittle, the State Board argued that the court should declare
Channel One contracts invalid because they are unconstitutional under
both the public purposes taxation requirement and the free public
schools mandate of the state constitution. 6° The seminal case construing
the public purposes doctrine is Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial De-
velopment Financing Authority,61 where the court outlined the governing
principles: The General Assembly has the initial responsibility for defin-
ing public purposes, and its determinations are, therefore, "entitled to
great weight"; 62 further, for a use to qualify as a public purpose, "the
ultimate net gain or advantage must be the public's as contradistin-
guished from that of an individual or private entity., 63
In Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp.,64 the supreme court fol-
lowed its ruling in Mitchell while clarifying the parameters of public pur-
poses. The Martin court held constitutional the state funding of a low-
income housing project6" because North Carolina suffered from a severe
shortage of decent housing for the poor, and the general public-even
those not directly benefitting from the housing-possessed an interest in
the promotion of health, safety, and welfare.66 Furthermore, the court
subsequently declared in Madison Cablevision v. City of Morganton 67 that
the term "public purpose" should be interpreted broadly, emphasizing
that it is not imperative that every citizen benefit from a particular
eg., id. § 115C-47(4) (1991) (giving local boards power to regulate extracurricular activities).
But see Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 767, 28 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1944) ("It is
generally held that local school authorities have the inherent power to make rules and regula-
tions for the discipline, government, and management of the schools and pupils within their
district.") (emphasis added).
60. See Whittle, 328 N.C. at 468-70, 402 S.E.2d at 563-64.
61. 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968).
62. Id. at 144, 159 S.E.2d at 750.
63. Id. This test must be satisfied notwithstanding the fact that public and private inter-
ests are typically so interrelated that they are difficult to separate. Id. For example, under the
act at issue in Mitchell, tax funds financed the construction of manufacturing plants in order to
promote industry in North Carolina. Id. at 145, 159 S.E.2d at 751. As a result, the public
presumably benefitted from increases in employment and state income. Of course, the private
companies who used the plants also benefitted from state-subsidized industrial development.
See id. at 158, 159 S.E.2d at 760.
64. 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).
65. Id. at 34, 175 S.E.2d at 667.
66. Id. at 44, 175 S.E.2d at 673. The underlying assumption the court relied upon is that
social and economic conditions will be important factors in the determination of what benefits
the public in common. The concept of public purposes, therefore, "expands with the popula-
tion, economy, scientific knowledge, and changing conditions." Mitchell, 273 N.C. at 144, 159
S.E.2d at 750.
67. 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).
1936 [Vol. 70
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undertaking.6 8
Finally, in Kiddie Korner,69 the court of appeals explored the public
purposes doctrine in the public school context, considering whether an
extended-day program, established by a county board of education and
operated in a public elementary school, violated the state constitution. 70
The court found that, although participating students gained a "private
benefit," the program also served the public generally because it fostered
scholastic achievement. 71 Thus, because education of the citizenry is "es-
sential to good government, morality and a good economy," the program
was .sufficiently "cloaked with a public purpose. '"72
In Whittle, the State Board also maintained that the Channel One
contracts violated a second state constitutional provision-the free public
schools mandate of article IX, section 2(1). The principal case constru-
ing this provision is Sneed v. Greensboro City Board of Education.73 In
Sneed, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of student fees for sup-
plementary instructional materials, such as science laboratory equipment
and art supplies.74 The supreme court held that modest and reasonable
fees imposed by local school boards on students who are financially able
68. Id. at 646, 386 S.E.2d at 207. Applying this standard, the Madison court held that the
establishment of a municipal cable television system met the public purposes test. Id. at 653,
386 S.E.2d at 211. To support its holding, the court cited examples of acts found to constitute
public purposes, including the funding of a railroad, airport, grain handling facility, public
park, state fair, public auditorium, and education generally. Id. at 650-51, 386 S.E.2d at 209-
10.
69. 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d
150 (1982).
70. Id. at 144-45, 285 S.E.2d at 117. Prior to discussing the public purposes implications
of the program, the court confirmed that the program indeed was supported by tax dollars. Id.
While extended-day school appears to operate on merely nominal costs, such as electricity and
fuel (teachers receive no additional pay and use of the building is free of charge), these ex-
penses accumulate over time and are sustained by taxpayers. Id.; see infra text accompanying
notes 104-07 for a comparison of Kiddie Korner to the supreme court's findings in Whfttie.
71. Kiddie Korner, 55 N.C. App. at 145, 285 S.E.2d at 117.
72. Id.; see also Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N.C. 86, 95, 253 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1979) ("[Pt is
well established that both appropriations and expenditures of public funds for the education of
the citizens of North Carolina are for a public purpose."); State Educ. Assistance Auth. v.
Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 588, 174 S.E.2d 551, 560 (1970) (holding the issuance of
revenue bonds to provide scholastic loans for low-income students to be a public purpose).
73. 299 N.C. 609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980).
74. Id. at 612, 264 S.E.2d at 109-10. The fees ranged from $5.00 per year for elementary
students to $14.00 per year for secondary students. Id. Much of the controversy surrounding
incidental fees concerns waivers given to students suffering from economic hardships. See id.
at 617-19, 264 S.E.2d at 113-14. The waivers are grounded in equal protection principles
because "equal access to participation in [the state] public school system is a fundamental
right." Id. at 618, 264 S.E.2d at 113; see also N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) ("The General
Assembly shall provide.., for a general and uniform system of free public schools... wherein
equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.") (emphasis added).
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to pay are not unconstitutional.75 In so holding, the court rejected the
argument that a 1970 amendment to the constitutional requirement of
free public schools clearly proscribed the collection of any student fees.76
The Whittle court's most comprehensive analysis focused on the
State Board's authority to promulgate the temporary rule limiting local
school boards' ability to acquire supplementary instructional materials
such as Channel One." Consequently, the result in Whittle ultimately
turned on the court's interpretation of section 115C-98(b) of the general
statutes, prior to its amendment in 1990.
The principal goal of statutory construction in North Carolina is to
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.78 The first step, therefore, is to
examine the text of the statute79 and construe the words according to
their common, ordinary meanings.8" The plain language of the 1987
statute interpreted in Whittle directed local school boards to adopt writ-
ten policies regarding the procedures for acquiring supplementary in-
structional materials; however, it did not necessarily grant them
exclusive authority over the process.81 In contrast, the 1990 amendment
to section 115C-98(b) positively states that local school boards have the
"sole authority to select and procure supplementary instructional materi-
75. Sneed, 299 N.C. at 617, 264 S.E.2d at 112-13. Similarly, the court of appeals in Kid-
die Korner approved an extended-day program where participants paid a fee; so long as basic
education remained tuition-free, the court reasoned, the constitutional mandate was satisfied.
Kiddie Corner, 55 N.C. App. at 139-40, 285 S.E.2d at 114.
76. Sneed, 299 N.C. at 612, 264 S.E.2d at 110. Prior to its amendment in 1970, article IX,
section 2(1) read: "The General Assembly... shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a
general and uniform system of public schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge ...."
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2 (1875). Thus, plaintiffs contended that the 1970 elimination
of the word "tuition" to qualify the word "free" represented a substantive change, conveying
the legislature's intent that public schools function completely without cost to students. Sneed,
299 N.C. at 613, 264 S.E.2d at 110. The court responded by pointing to other parts of the
constitution prior to 1970 which contained the phrase "free public schools" and by conducting
an historical review that led to the conclusion that the provision never has been understood to
preclude the imposition of incidental fees for supplementary educational materials. Id. at 613-
14, 264 S.E.2d at 110-11; see also NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMM'N,
1968 REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR AND THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR As-
SOCIATION 34 (1968) (noting that the language of the constitution was modified to reflect
contemporary administrative practices).
77. See Whittle, 328 N.C. at 463-68, 402 S.E.2d at 560-63.
78. Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291,294 (1991);
State ex. rel. Hunt v. North Carolina Reins. Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405
(1981).
79. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 294.
80. State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 435, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984); Lafayette Transp. Serv.
v. County of Robeson, 283 N.C. 494, 500, 196 S.E.2d 770, 774 (1973).
81. See Whittle, 328 N.C. at 472, 402 S.E.2d at 565 (Martin, J., dissenting). The statute is
quoted supra at note 35.
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als, whether or not the materials contain commercial advertising." 2
In interpreting a statute with reference to an amendment, it can be
assumed that "the legislature intended either to change the substance of
the original act or to clarify the meaning of the statute. '8 3 The presump-
tion, however, is that the legislature adopted the amendment in order to
alter the law. 4 Thus, Justice Martin in dissent argued that if local
school boards had exclusive control over the selection of supplementary
instructional materials before the amendment to section 115C-98(b), "the
amendment would indeed have been unnecessary and useless."'8 5 But the
presumption that an amendment changes the original meaning of a stat-
ute is "merely an aid to interpretation-not an absolute rule.",8 6 Accord-
ingly, courts commonly hold that subsequent amendments shed light on
prior legislative intent.8 7 The Whittle majority took this approach, main-
taining that the amendment to section 115C-98(b) eliminated any uncer-
tainties as to the appropriate reading of the 1987 version.8 3
On the surface, the conclusion that the 1990 amendment "made
clear what the statutes already provided ' 89 appears questionable. The
argument for clarification is strongest when the legislature amends an
ambiguous statute. 90 The words of the 1987 provision are not ambigu-
ous-they order local boards to prepare written policies concerning the
selection of instructional materials. 91 Furthermore, the 1990 amendment
does not change just a few words; it adds entirely new provisions regard-
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-98(b) (1991); see supra note 44 and accompanying text. The
legislature also amended § 115C-47 of the general statutes by adding the identical provision to
local boards' enumerated powers. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(33) (1991); see supra text ac-
companying note 52.
83. State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 240, 333 S.E.2d 245, 250 (1985) (citing Childers v.
Parker's, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260, 162 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1968)).
84. State em rel. Util. Comm'n v. Public Serv. Co., 307 N.C. 474, 480, 299 S.E.2d 425,
429 (1983); Childers, 274 N.C. at 260, 162 S.E.2d at 483-84.
85. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 472, 402 S.E.2d at 565 (Martin, J., dissenting).
86. Childers, 274 N.C. at 260, 162 S.E.2d at 484.
87. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Kinlaw, 78 N.C. App. 521, 524, 338 S.E.2d 114,
118 (1985); Childers, 274 N.C. at 263, 162 S.E.2d at 485.
88. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 468, 402 S.E.2d at 563. The Whittle court also premised its
public policy analysis on the assumption that the 1990 amendment to § 115C-98(b) clarified
the existing meaning of the statute. Specifically, the court concluded that the General Assem-
bly expressed its position on the public policy of the Channel One contracts when it passed the
1990 amendment to § I15C-98(b), which gave local school boards the power to contract for
supplementary instructional materials containing commercial advertising, notwithstanding ap-
proval from the State Board, and therefore found no violation. Id. at 471, 402 S.E.2d at 564.
89. Id. at 468, 402 S.E.2d at 563.
90. See Childers, 274 N.C. at 260, 162 S.E.2d at 484.
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The legislative history announcing the
purpose of the statute, however, increases the ambiguity of the statute. See infra notes 95-96
and accompanying text.
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ing control over the process and commercial advertising.92 Finally, if the
General Assembly actually intended to grant exclusive authority to local
boards prior to the amendment, it could have done so unequivocally.93
Thus, the addition of explicit language after the Channel One contro-
versy arose does not necessarily remove doubt as to the meaning of the
statute in 1987.
The Whittle decision, however, is not fatally flawed. Following an
analysis of the statutory language, courts should consider the history of
the legislation to uncover further legislative intent. 94 The General As-
sembly articulated the purposes of the statute in the preamble to the 1969
session law.9" The statute was enacted because (1) "it is desirable that
the selection of supplementary instructional materials be made by each
school administrative unit"; (2) "technological breakthroughs" have en-
abled local school systems to acquire a wide variety and large volume of
such materials; and (3) "local units should be encouraged to design and
develop instructional programs that will meet the specific needs of each
child in every school situation." 96 Thus, because the legislative history
suggests that the General Assembly intended to confer such local control
with respect to supplementary instructional materials, the Whittle court's
holding is not without support.
Finally, courts also determine legislative intent by considering the
policy objectives underlying the statute.97 The most important policy
concern of section 115C-98(b) relates to the concept of state versus local
control. In general, local school boards possess more limited powers
than does the State Board because they are deemed "agents" of the state
with an obligation to implement State Board policies.9" Nevertheless,
92. See State ex rel Util. Comm'n v. Public Serv. Co., 307 N.C. 474,480, 299 S.E.2d 425,
429 (1983) (noting that the presumption that the legislature intended to change the law is
especially strong when the statutory language is "drastically altered").
93. See id. at 480, 299 S.E.2d at 429 (refusing to order payment refund distribution based
on customer class because "if [it] had been the legislature's intention, it would have been a
simple proposition for them to have explicitly provided for such a method").
94. See Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 SE.2d 291, 295
(1991); Victory Cab Co. v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 576, 68 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1951).
95. See Whittle, 328 N.C. at 464-65, 402 S.E.2d at 561; supra notes 47-49 and accompany-
ing text.
96. Act of May 19, 1969, ch. 519, § 115C-206.14(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 440, 444 (cur-
rent version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-98(b) (1991)).
97. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 294; see also Campbell v. First Baptist
Church, 298 N.C. 476, 484, 259 S.E.2d 558, 564 (1979) (stating that in examining statutory
policy issues, courts may consider the consequences which would follow from a particular
construction). But see Deese v. Southeastern Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 277,
293 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1982) (asserting that courts should avoid "judicial legislation").
98. See Kiddie Korner Day Sch. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 55 N.C. App.
134, 140, 285 S.E.2d 110, 114 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d 150 (1982);
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when the General Assembly enacted section 115C-98(b), it made a policy
judgment that local units make certain decisions more effectively than
does a state-wide administrative body.99 Although the Whittle court did
not discuss the merits of local autonomy in public education, its decision
that the statute gave local boards the exclusive authority to regulate the
Channel One contracts is in accord with this policy preference for local
control.00
The supreme court also decided Whittle on two state constitutional
grounds. 101 First, the court held that article V, section 2(1) of the North
supra text accompanying note 58; see also Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Lawyers and Education
Reform, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 293, 299 (1991) (introduction to symposium: Investing in Our
Children's Future: School Finance Reform in the '90s) ("The stated tradition is local control,
but state law and actors are often dominant because local governmental units, including school
districts, are creatures of state law."). Moreover, while the State Board has broad authority to
supervise the public school system pursuant to the state constitution, local boards have only
those specific rule-making powers which are statutorily created. See supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying note 96.
100. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Bob Etheridge, has acknowledged the
value of local autonomy:
Superintendent Etheridge stated that while he has very strong feelings about granting
more local control, he personally opposed showing Channel One in public schools
because it places the selection of instructional materials outside the schools and the
contract requires that schools make students, as a captive audience, watch the pro-
gram and its commercial messages 95 percent of the 180-day school year.
Minutes of the February 1, 1990 Meeting of the North Carolina State Board of Education, 1
(emphasis added).
Cases and commentators on various aspects of public education have recognized the im-
portance of local autonomy. See, e.g., desegregation decrees: Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 741 (1974) ("[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools"); William L. Christopher, Note, Ignoring the Soul of
Brown: Board of Education v. Dowell, 70 N.C. L. Rv. 615, 634-35 (1992) (loss of local
autonomy over public education reduces community involvement); First Amendment rights:
Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the value of local control
over student speech), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); Alan Goldberg, Comment, Textbook
Removal Decisions and the First Amendment-A Better Balance, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1317, 1338
(1989) (local school boards need broad discretionary powers in the First Amendment area);
and funding: Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 653, 458 A.2d 758,
788 (1983) (funding schemes should be arranged to promote local control over public school
systems); Edley, supra note 98, at 299-300 (discussing the horizontal and vertical dimensions
of governance of education).
101. Interestingly, Whittle never raised a freedom of expression argument during the
Channel One litigation. Nevertheless, an analysis based on the First Amendment or Article I,
§ 14 of the North Carolina Constitution may be appropriate. The First Amendment provides
in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Similarly, the North Carolina Constitution states: "Free-
dom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and shall never be
restrained, but every person shall be held responsible for their abuse." N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 14.
Any claim that the State Board's attempted interference with the Channel One contracts
1941
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Carolina Constitution 10 2 does not apply to Channel One contracts and
thereby avoided determining whether Channel One constitutes a public
purpose with respect to taxation.'0 3 In so holding, the court rejected the
State Board's claim that because tax revenues support Channel One, tax-
payers subsidize private business."° Specifically, the State Board con-
tended that the public purposes doctrine controlled because taxes finance
the public school system as a whole.'0 5 In response, the majority opinion
suggested that funds already committed to certain expenditures do not
qualify as "taxpayer support."'0 6 The court further reasoned that any
additional tax dollars expended as a result of the Channel One contracts
were used only for the electricity required to operate the televisions and
VCRs, a cost too trivial to consider.' 0 7
Although energy costs appear insignificant at first glance, they accu-
mulate over time and will increase as more schools receive Channel One.
deprived Whittle of the right to free expression would have been weakened by the fact that the
program airs in public schools and contains commercial advertising. See David A. Diamond,
The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L.
REV. 477, 493-99 (1981) ("[clonventional first amendment analysis is inappropriate in the pub-
lic school situation"). The Supreme Court held in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), that a policy prohibiting students from wearing symbolic
armbands violated the First Amendment, for "[ilt can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." Id. at 506. But in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the Court
narrowed its ruling in Tinker by holding that, while school authorities generally cannot silence
personal expression that occurs on school premises, they have more latitude to regulate the
content of activities characterized as part of the school curriculum in order "to assure that
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach." Id. at 271. Clearly, the
latter situation would govern the Channel One controversy, as Whittle repeatedly stressed that
the program serves educational purposes. Furthermore, commercial speech, which encom-
passes Channel One, is protected by the First Amendment, but not to the same degree as other
forms of expression. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977); Williams v. Spencer, 622
F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that school officials could ban circulation of a drug
paraphernalia advertisement); see generally Ralph D. Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Free
Speech and Public Education: An Overview of Legal, Social, and Political Issues, 16 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 873 (1985) (providing a comprehensive study of freedom of expression in the
public school context).
102. See supra note 37 for the text of the constitutional provision.
103. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 469, 402 S.E.2d at 563.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see supra note 38.
106. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 469, 402 S.E.2d at 563. In their brief, defendants cited Penn
Compression Moulding v. Mar-Bal, Inc., 73 N.C. App. 291, 326 S.E.2d 280, aff'd, 314 N.C.
528, 334 S.E.2d 391 (1985), to support this proposition. See Defendant Appellees' Brief at 29,
Whittle (No. 164PA90). By citing Mar-Bal, defendants drew an analogy between taxation and
the principle of contract law that a preexisting duty is not sufficient consideration. See Mar-
Bal, 73 N.C. App. at 294, 326 S.E.2d at 282. The use of this analogy, which is reasonable but
not highly probative given that contract law is not at issue in Whittle, demonstrates the lack of
case law directly on point.
107. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 469, 402 S.E.2d at 563.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized this cumulative effect
in Kiddie Korner ' when it held that the public purposes constitutional
mandate applied to an extended-day school, despite the fact that the pro-
gram operated on nominal additional costs. 109 Furthermore, because
Whittle furnishes television monitors, VCRs, and satellite dishes to sub-
scribing schools, money which would otherwise be spent purchasing such
equipment can be used for alternative purposes. ° This arrangement
could be construed as a form of "indirect" expenditure, possibly permit-
ting an application of the public purposes doctrine to Channel One
contracts.
If future courts determine that tax dollars support Channel One,
they will have to address the question of whether the program qualifies as
a public purpose. The basic test for determining public purposes within
the meaning of article V, section 2(1) of the state constitution is whether
the use benefits the general public, as opposed to particular individu-
als.I North Carolina courts have favored a broad interpretation of the
public purposes doctrine. For instance, in Madison Cablevision,1 2 the
supreme court, upholding the financing of a city cable system with public
funds despite claims that cable television benefits only select individu-
als, 1 3 clearly stated that the term "public purpose" should be construed
liberally.114 Additionally, in Hughey v. Cloninger1" 5 and Kiddie Kor-
ner,1 1 6 the courts unequivocally held that education is a public
purpose. 117
Thus, if the constitutional requirement of public purposes is applied
to Channel One contracts in the future, the resolution may turn on
whether the program is properly considered an educational tool, despite
the inclusion of commercial advertisements. Because the concept of pub-
lic purposes evolves with current social conditions, 1 8 and because televi-
108. 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d
150 (1982).
109. Id. at 144-45, 285 S.E.2d at 117. See supra note 70.
110. See Let Schools Choose 'Channel One" N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1989, at A26 (editorial
praising Channel One).
111. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the traditional public
purposes test.
112. 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).
113. Id. at 653, 386 S.E.2d at 211.
114. Id. at 646, 386 S.E.2d at 207; see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
115. 297 N.C. 86, 253 S.E.2d 898 (1979).
116. 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d
150 (1982).
117. Hughey, 297 N.C. at 95, 253 S.E.2d at 904; Kiddie Korner, 55 N.C. App. at 145, 285
S.E.2d at 117; see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
118. Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 43, 175 S.E.2d 665, 672 (1970);
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sion has become such an influential and diverse medium in modern
society, Whittle could advance an argument to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. 119
The second constitutional issue raised by Whittle concerns the free
public schools provision of article IX, section 2(1) of the North Carolina
Constitution. 120 The State Board contended that by watching Channel
One, students incur an opportunity cost which violates the constitutional
requirement. 121 Rejecting this claim, the court stressed that no specific
"fee" ensues from the Channel One contracts. 122 This is consistent with
the few previous cases addressing the free public schools provision, each
of which involved the charging of actual fees. 123 Furthermore, the Whit-
tle court emphasized that there is no basis in the case law to conclude
Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750
(1968). See supra note 66.
119. This line of reasoning ultimately concerns the merits of Channel One-a venture upon
which the Whittle court did not embark. The main benefits of Channel One are twofold: first,
the program enhances students' awareness of current events, which American students com-
monly lack; and second, subscribing schools receive, free of charge, approximately $50,000
worth of equipment which can be used for a variety of functions in addition to showing the
program. See Let Schools Choose 'Channel One' supra note 110, at A26. In this respect,
Channel One clearly serves educational purposes. On the other hand, the primary drawback
to Channel One is philosophical in nature-the program promotes commercialism in public
schools (which some argue diminishes any educational value the program may have). See
Hallifax, supra note 1, at 499-501 (describing the precept of ACT that children's advertising is
inherently deceptive); but see Kleinfield, supra note 3, at 79 ("Advertising is making available a
good program .... It is a trade-off.") (quoting Chris Whittle).
Justice Martin touched on the question of whether Channel One possesses educational
utility in his dissent. Refuting the majority's conclusion that § 115C-98(b) of the general stat-
utes governed the facts at hand, he emphasized that based on the record, Channel One is not
"needed for instructional purposes." Whittle, 328 N.C. at 476, 402 S.E.2d at 468 (Martin, J.,
dissenting). Specifically, he referred to a study which surveyed North Carolina students and
teachers concerning Channel One and concluded that the content of Channel One was rarely
the subject of tests or classroom discussions and therefore had "no significant effect" on the
current events information students retained. Id. (Martin, J. dissenting); see Tim Simmons,
TVNews in Classroom Ineffective, Study Finds, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 21,
1991, at Al.
120. Article IX, § 2(1) is quoted supra at note 40.
121. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 470, 402 S.E.2d at 564.
122. Id.; see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 73-76, discussing Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C.
609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980), and Kiddie Korner Day Sch. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d
150 (1982). Indeed, student fees are becoming increasingly common as public schools con-
tinue to experience financial difficulties. See generally Patricia M. Harris, Note, Student Fees
in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of Education, 72 IoWA L. REV. 1401, 1402, 1421 (1987)
(reviewing the constitutional and practical implications of student fees). In 1976-77, approxi-
mately 80% of the North Carolina school districts levied some type of student fees. Anne M.
Dellinger, The Unresolved Status of Public School Fees, 9 SCH. L. BuLL., April 1978, at 1, 4.
1992] NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
that "time equals money" for purposes of the state constitution. 124
Moreover, even if a future court should decide that Channel One con-
tracts do involve a fee within the meaning of article IX, section 2(1), the
agreements probably would meet the test established in Sneed-modest
and reasonable fees for supplementary instructional materials are consti-
tutionally permissible.1 2 In other words, it would be logical for a court
to conclude that two minutes (the amount of commercial advertising in
each program) out of a seven hour school day constitutes a modest and
reasonable time expenditure.
In conclusion, the judgment of the Whittle court represents a tri-
umph for local autonomy in public education. The plain language of
section 115C-98(b) of the general statutes, prior to the 1990 amendments,
does not grant local school boards sole control over the selection and
procurement of supplementary instructional materials.126 Thus, based
on the text of the 1987 statute alone, the court's determination that the
statute gave local school boards exclusive authority over the process is
subject to debate.1 27 Nevertheless, the 1990 amendment to the statute
provides a clear expression of the legislature's intent to confer such con-
trol, and subsequent amendments may be instrumental in ascertaining
the meaning of the original version.1 2 1 Most importantly, the legislative
history of the statute strongly supports the court's conclusion; in the pre-
amble to the antecedent session law, the General Assembly explicitly
stated that the purpose of the statute was to enable local administrative
units to make the decisions regarding the selection of supplementary in-
structional materials.12 9 Finally, the statute's most significant policy ob-
jective-to increase local control in public education-is a factor
contributing to the determination of legislative intent. Although the
Whittle court did not evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of local
control over the selection of materials such as Channel One, its decision
follows from a recognition of the underlying policy concerns addressed
by the General Assembly.130 While centralized control arguably facili-
124. Whittle, 328 N.C. at 470, 402 S.E.2d at 564. The Whittle court also refused to apply
the constitutional requirement to Channel One contracts because, under the agreements, stu-
dents are not compelled to watch the program. Id. But financially-needy students are not
required to pay incidental fees if they qualify for a waiver, and the free public schools provision
still applies. See supra note 74. Additionally, it is questionable whether students actually feel
free to decline to watch Channel One, or whether these contractual terms simply amount to
boilerplate language.
125. Sneed, 299 N.C. at 617, 264 S.E.2d at 112-13.
126. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 82, 87-88 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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tates efficiency and uniformity, local control encourages community in-
volvement and allows administrators to tailor programs to the needs of
individual schools and students.131 Therefore, the Whittle court sensibly
concluded that the legislature intended local units to have the ultimate
power to decide whether receiving Channel One is in the best interests of
their schools.
From a state constitutional perspective, the Whittle court's analysis
also is sound. The public purposes requirement of article V, section 2(1)
applies only when tax money is spent to finance a particular undertaking.
Thus, in the court's view, because no additional tax dollars support
Channel One, aside from minimal electricity costs, the public purposes
doctrine was of no consequence. 132 This conclusion is reasonable, but it
would have been more convincing had the Whittle court distinguished
the position previously reached by the court of appeals in a similar
case. 133 While arguments exist for future application of the public pur-
poses test to Channel One, they remain tenuous without further evidence
of tax revenues financing the program.
Similarly, the free public schools provision of article IX, section 2(1)
of the state constitution is implicated only when schools charge students
some type of actual fee to enjoy certain educational activities. No North
Carolina precedent has established that spending time on a particular
undertaking is the equivalent of paying for it within the meaning of the
free public schools provision. 34 Therefore, the Whittle court reasonably
dismissed this constitutional claim as well, and its decision, which fol-
lows the national trend toward local autonomy,1 35 is substantially justi-
fied.
MICHELE L. HARRINGTON
131. See supra note 100.
132. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
133. See supra text accompanying note 108-09.
134. See supra note 122-24 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Defendant Appellees' Brief at 15, Whittle (No. 164PA90) ("At the time of
trial, Whittle had entered into ... agreements with approximately 2,700 schools in 33 states in
the United States. These 33 states have all left the decision about whether [Channel One] is a
useful instructional tool to local school professionals and local boards of education.").
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